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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus has this motto: “…and whatever a 
man knows, whatever is not mere rumbling and roaring that he has heard, can be said in 
three words.”  
There is a ‘tension’ in the Tractatus between whether or not ethics may be known. 
I contend that the motto helps resolve this tension and that therein lies its importance. I 
address, inter alia, the origin of this motto, some philosophical influences on 
Wittgenstein, the phenomena/noumena distinction and Wittgenstein’s distinction between 
‘sense’ and ‘nonsense.’ I, then, treat Wittgenstein’s say/show distinction and how the 
Tractatus beckons not to the poverty of silence but to the richness of activity. Next, I 
address Wittgenstein’s teaching that an ethical insight is not something cognitively 
reasoned but something compassionately felt. Finally, I interpret the motto as beckoning 
not to philosophical imponderables but to a principled life.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of presenting philosophy in a laconic literary style doubtless holds 
fascination. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, for example, trumpets on its 
title page the following motto: “…and whatever a man knows, whatever is not mere 
rumbling and roaring that he has heard, can be said in three words.” This motto adduced 
by Wittgenstein anticipates his remark in the Preface: “…what can be said at all can be 
said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.”1  
The motto is divisible into a subject and a predicate. The subject is “…whatever a 
man knows” which implies epistemic access to knowledge. The predicate is “can be said 
in three words” which carries an implication of a limitation upon meaningful discourse. 
Hence, the significance of the motto is that what can be grasped by human knowledge 
can be verbalized succinctly. However, such significance itself is ambiguous for the 
reason that it could mean either that we humans do not know much at all or, alternatively, 
that there is a limitation on how we can express ourselves. I shall consider the former 
reading in the earlier sections of my thesis where I contend that the motto adumbrates the 
phenomena/noumena distinction and the sense/nonsense distinction. I shall address the 
                                                 
1 D. F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, Ludwig Wittgenstein – Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,  London: 
Routledge, 2007,  page 3 
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latter reading in the later sections of my thesis in which I contend that the motto operates 
on several levels to shed light on the meaning of the text that follows it, one of which is 
Wittgenstein’s innovative say/show distinction. Significantly, with respect to 
Wittgenstein’s treatment of ethics and whether or not we have epistemic access to ethical 
insights I contend in Section VIII that the motto helps resolve that tension and that 
therein lies its importance. In the remaining section we see how the motto evokes 
associations with Ferdinand Kürnberger, the motto’s author, whose life exemplified the 
teaching of the Tractatus. 
II. The Motto of the Tractatus  
Located on the title page of the Tractatus, the motto reads: “…und alles, was man 
weiss, nicht bloss rauschen und brausen gehört hat, lässt sich in drei Worten sagen. 
Kürnberger.”2  
      (1) The significance of a motto. A motto can be a maxim adopted as an 
expression of one’s guiding principle as when done by a person or organization. For the 
purposes of this paper, however, we shall consider a motto as it applies to inanimate 
objects, in particular, literary works: namely, as a short quotation prefixed to a literary 
work or to one of its parts, and expressing some idea appropriate to the contents.  
Strategically, the positioning of the motto on the title page allows it to give a foretaste of 
what is to come. As to the functions of a motto, they include: (1) to provide the reader a 
perspective or tone, (2) to specify the meaning of the text that follows, (3) to comment on 
that text, and (4) to evoke associations with the motto’s author or her writings.  
                                                 
2 The Pears and McGuinness translation is: “…and whatever a man knows, whatever is not mere rumbling 
or roaring that he has heard, can be said in three words.” Title page of the Tractatus. 
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      (2) The origin of this motto.  The words chosen by Wittgenstein for the 
Tractatus’ motto first appeared in “Das Denkmalsetzen in der Opposition” published in 
the Deutsche Zeitung, late autumn 1873 by Ferdinand Kürnberger. Ferdinand Kürnberger 
was born in Vienna on July 3, 1821 and died in Munich on October 14, 1879.3 
      Kürnberger was an Austrian writer who utilized more than one medium: he 
published both in book form and in newspapers. He, apparently, made quite a reputation 
for himself as the author of editorial-type articles in the Vienna newspapers called 
feuilletons.4  The French verb feuilleter comes from the root word for ‘leaf’ and means 
‘to skim (a book).’ Such articles appeared on the editorial page but below the line and 
were known to be satirical in nature. An outspoken man, Kürnberger had been called the 
‘Stammvater’ or founding father of Viennese critical journalism and was likened to 
ancient Rome’s Cato for his pursuit of truth. Kürnberger is remembered in history more 
for participation in the Austrian Revolution of 1848 and in the Dresden Rebellion of 1849 
than for his literary works. Significantly, he was forced to flee Austria in 1848 and was 
jailed for his involvement in the Dresden Rebellion of the following year.5 (It is 
remarkable that the author of the motto that Wittgenstein chose for his second book, 
Philosophical Investigations, Johann Nestroy, also was jailed more than once for his 
political activism.6)  
      As remarked in Wittgenstein’s Vienna,  
                                                 
3 http://www.bookrags.com/biography/ferdinand-kuernberger-dlb (August 2008) 
4 ibid. 
5 http://original.britannica.com/eb/article-9046480/Ferdinand-Kuernberger(August 2008) 
6 http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-Nestroy.html (September 2009) 
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Wittgenstein himself did nothing to cut himself off from the wider literary and 
cultural traditions with which he was familiar in his youth. His comparative 
ignorance of the older philosophical classics was counterbalanced by rich and 
varied familiarity with the main figures on the German and Austrian scene. And 
the mottoes he chose for his two chief books were taken from authors who could 
hardly have been more typically Viennese—Kürnberger for the Tractatus, 
Nestroy for the Investigations.7 
 
While we do not know the full nature and extent of the influence of Kürnberger on 
Wittgenstein suffice it to say that Wittgenstein was familiar with the reputation of 
Kürnberger as an activist and outspoken critic of civil authority. 
      Kürnberger’s 1873 article contains a scenario in which he poses a question to a 
semi-educated person and the same question to a moderately (or well) educated person, 
receiving two different answers. Kürnberger’s question has to do with the difference 
between ancient and modern art.  
      Kürnberger writes:  
 
    If I ask a semi-educated man: What is the difference between antiquity and 
modern, between classical and romantic art, he may answer in great confusion: 
Sir, this question conjures up entire realms of possibilities. This is a matter for 
entire books and Winter Semesters at university. 
    If, on the other hand, I ask the same question of a man of moderately or 
advanced learning, I will invariably receive the answer: Sir, this can be stated in 
three words. The arts of antiquity issued forth from the body, the arts of 
modernity arise from the soul. The arts of antiquity were therefore sculptural, 
while the arts of modernity are lyrical, musical, artistic—in brief—romantic.8 
 
      It is significant that Kürnberger introduces the reader to his expression ‘in three 
words’ in the foregoing passage. The reader can tell that by such expression Kürnberger 
means to express the idea of something that is ‘brief’ and ‘to-the-point.’ This is so 
                                                 
7Allan Janik and Stephen Toulman, Wittgenstein’s Vienna, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973, 
Introduction, p.27 
8 Translation from German, Literarische Herzenssachen Reflexionem und Kritiken, Deutsche Zeitung,  
1873, pages 339-341 
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because the semi-educated person was overwhelmed and replied that the answer to that 
question would take a long time to assemble and narrate. Perhaps, the semi-educated 
person was incapable of giving a succinct, correct answer for the reason that he did not 
understand the actual difference between ancient art and modern art. 
      The well educated person in Kürnberger’s essay summarizes his answer 
succinctly by a contrast between the more physical nature of statuary of the ancients 
which emphasized the beauty of the human body and the more lyrical nature of romantic 
art of the then-contemporary times which emphasized the beauty of the human mind.  
      Kürnberger continues:  
Bravo! Thus it is possible for entire worlds of ideas, if one truly masters them, to 
fit within a nutshell, and everything that one knows that hasn’t been dedicated 
solely to rushing about and shouting can be summed up in three words. And one 
more thing: If that is in fact the case, then why are we so insistent in setting up 
monuments to modernity?9 
 
Thus, the reader is given by Kürnberger a repetition of his chosen phrase ‘in three words’ 
in the succeeding passage and, of course, it is this passage that Wittgenstein chooses as 
the Tractatus’ motto. It is in this context that Kürnberger gives the reader the visual 
image ‘in a nutshell’ to explain what he meant by ‘in three words.’ Kürnberger 
emphasizes that a true grasp of the knowledge of ancient and modern art permitted its 
knower to be succinct in his response. The moral of the story, so to speak, is that 
profound concepts could be stated briefly.   
What, then, is the significance of the Tractatus’ motto? It is that what can be 
grasped through human knowledge can be verbalized succinctly. How and why is that 
                                                 
9 ibid., page 340 
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true? It is true because (1) there is an implied limit to what human knowledge can attain 
and (2) there is an implied limitation on how human beings can verbalize what we know.  
We shall consider the former below in Section IV and V and the latter in Section VI to 
IX.   
III. Some Philosophical Influences on Wittgenstein’s Thought  
      In order to make the connection between the motto and the text of the Tractatus 
let us consider some of the philosophical influences on Wittgenstein’s thought. 
     Georg Henrik von Wright who knew Wittgenstein at Cambridge later wrote the 
‘Biographical Sketch’ of Wittgenstein which was published in Norman Malcolm’s 1958 
Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir. Professor von Wright remembered that Wittgenstein 
had personally told him that he (Wittgenstein) had read Schopenhauer’s Die Welt als 
Wille und Vorstellung in his youth and that his first philosophy was a Schopenhauerian 
epistemological idealism.10  Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) is in the Kantian tradition 
and, of course, made original contributions to philosophy.  
 Barbara Hannan makes the case that Wittgenstein was substantially influenced by 
Schopenhauer in a passage in her book: 
The Tractatus is filled with images and ideas that obviously have their origin in 
Schopenhauer’s work. See particularly 5.6 – 5.641 and 6.423 – 7. These images 
                                                 
10Georg Henrik von Wright, ‘Biographical Sketch’ in Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958, page 5. This is in harmony with The Story of Philosophy where 
author Bryan Magee wrote: “For the rest of his [Wittgenstein’s] life he accepted a view of total reality that 
saw it as divided between, on the one hand, a realm of which we could have no conceptual understanding 
and about which we could therefore say nothing, and on the other hand this phenomenal world of our 
experience, which we could indeed talk about and attempt to understand. Intelligible philosophy, he always 
thought, had to confine itself to the world we could talk about, on pain of becoming meaningless nonsense 
if it stepped across the borderline.”  Bryan Magee,  The Story of Philosophy, New York: Dorling 
Kindersley, 2001,  page 202 
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and ideas evidently took root in Wittgenstein’s mind when he read WWR [The 
World as Will and Representation] in his youth.11 
 
Accordingly, let us examine some examples from Schopenhauer’s philosophy that 
appealed to the so-called “early Wittgenstein”, namely, ‘the eye’, ‘riddle’, ‘ladder’ and 
‘seeing the world aright.’  
Schopenhauer asserts, respecting the ‘self’, that the subject of representations is a 
single consciousness in which many diverse experiences of objects are united.12 One of 
his favorite metaphorical images for it is the eye that looks out on the world but cannot 
see itself. 13 Significantly, in section 5.633, Wittgenstein uses the image of a human eye 
and writes, in part: “But really you do not see the eye.” 
Metaphysics according to Schopenhauer consists in attempting to find the 
“solution to the riddle of the world.”14 Wittgenstein uses the term ‘riddle’ twice in the 
Tractatus, declaring at 6.4312 that: “The solution to the riddle of life in space and time 
lies outside space and time.” In the subsection that follows I shall address two images 
borrowed by Wittgenstein from Schopenhauer relative to ethics. 
  Two images, ‘the ladder’ and ‘seeing the world aright’ both appear in the 
Tractatus’ penultimate section, 6.54. The first of these images is traceable to 
Schopenhauer according to Hans-Johann Glock in his article, “Schopenhauer and 
                                                 
11 Barbara Hannan, The Riddle of the World – A Reconsideration of Schopenhauer’s Philosophy, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009,  page 16,  Footnote 26 
12 Christopher Janaway, Schopenhauer, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994,  page 42 
13 ibid., page 42 
14 ibid., p.18 
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Wittgenstein – Language as Representation and Will.” 15 The ladder image was first used 
by Schopenhauer and then put to use in the enigmatic penultimate section of the 
Tractatus, which provides, in part: “(He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he 
has climbed up it.)”  Glock, then, turns his attention to the ethical posture of one’s 
attitude to the world and finds a fruitful comparison between Schopenhauer and 
Wittgenstein. Glock writes: “For both Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein, the good life does 
not involve any imposition of my will on the course of events, but an attitude—‘seeing 
the world aright.’” 16  
Schopenhauer was among the first of the 19th century philosophers to accept that, 
at its core, the universe is not a rational place.17   In The Fourfold Root of the Principle of 
Sufficient Cause, Schopenhauer critically examines the disposition to assume that what is 
real is what is rational.18 Schopenhauer’s originality resides in his conception of the Will 
as being devoid of rationality or intellect.19 Life requires us to face a world that is endless 
striving and blind impulse with no end in view, lawless, absolutely free, entirely self-
determining and almighty.20  In effect, Schopenhauer’s metaphysics determines his 
ethics; the result is a world that is indifferent to us but in which we have an ethics of 
compassion for fellow travelers to the grave. Hannan, cited above, continues her 
description of Schopenhauerian ethics: “Since nothing can be justified outside the 
                                                 
15 Hans-Johann Glock, “Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein-Language as Representation and Will”, ed. 
Christopher Janaway, The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999,  pages 434 -442 
16 ibid., p.442 
17 Robert Wicks,  “Arthur Schopenhauer” , Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, page 1, 
http://www.plato.stanford.edu/ (November 2007) 
18 ibid., page 5 
19 ibid., page 10 
20 ibid., page 12 
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structures imposed by reason, this mystical ethical insight, and the way people attain it, 
must remain, ultimately, a mystery. It is felt, not reasoned.”21 As we shall see in Section 
VIII, below, Wittgenstein executes his own turn from the cognitive to the non-cognitive 
regarding ethics. 
Another respected American philosopher, Max Black, whose A Companion to 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is iconic, writes about Schopenhauer’s influence on the author 
of the Tractatus: “Parts of the book date back to 1913 and some of the concluding 
remarks on ethics and the will may have been composed still earlier, when Wittgenstein 
admired Schopenhauer.”22  As noted above Professor von Wright was told by 
Wittgenstein that his first philosophy was a Schopenhauerian epistemological idealism. 
Janaway considers this matter to be well-settled. He writes that 
Wittgenstein … did not come across Schopenhauer’s works in an academic 
setting. He read them as part of the stock of ideas with which Viennese high 
society was furnished…. In fact, not to have read Schopenhauer would have been 
the odd thing for a young person from a cultured family such as Wittgenstein’s.23 
 
As remembered by Professor von Wright, above, and as attested to by the 
historian of philosophy, Magee, above, the early Wittgenstein existed in the Kantian-
Schopenhauerian tradition of the phenomena/noumena distinction. This tradition 
accepted that it is an imperfect world in which we live, that, although we may wish to 
have epistemic access to the noumenal world, we are restricted to access to the world of 
                                                 
21 op. cit., Hannan, page 92-93 
22 Max Black,  A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 
1964, page 1 
23 op. cit., Janaway, Schopenhauer, page 104-105 
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phenomena. Hence, despite a desire for a thorough knowledge of reality we are limited to 
the knowledge of what we perceive through the five senses.   
In the section that follows I shall consider how the motto adumbrates the 
phenomena/noumena distinction that imbues the Tractatus. 
IV. The Phenomena/ Noumena Distinction.  
This phenomena/noumena distinction and the limit to what human knowledge can 
attain are reflected in the Tractatus.24  
      In 4.113, we see that “Philosophy sets limits to the much disputed sphere of 
natural science.” At 4.114 we see that philosophy: “must set limits to what can be 
thought; and, in doing so, to what cannot be thought. It must set limits to what cannot be 
thought by working outwards through what can be thought.” 
      For Wittgenstein, then, the application of the techniques of philosophical analysis 
to natural science has the wholesome effects of clarifying and elucidating scientific 
thoughts, up to the point of acknowledging the limits of knowledge. Philosophy, when 
put into practice, disciplines the thinker to stay within the realm of natural science, i.e. 
what can be known, on pain of sliding into meaningless, nonsensical speculation if one 
crosses the borderline into what cannot be thought. The aforementioned sections of the 
Tractatus clearly reflect that a true philosopher is not only justified but affirmatively 
required to adhere to the evidence and metrics of the scientific method, the realm of 
phenomena. 
                                                 
24 op. cit., Pears and McGuinness, See 4.113, 4.114, 4.115, 4.116 and 6.53. 
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      Wittgenstein continues with his following aphorism about philosophy: “It will 
signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said.” (4.115) and 
“Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly. Everything that can be put 
into words can be put clearly.” (4.116) 
      For Wittgenstein, then, philosophy has the felicitous result of signifying what 
speculation to avoid by pointing out the fruitful field of natural science. The 
aforementioned sections of the Tractatus reflect that a true philosopher will abhor the 
conjecture and speculation associated with the noumenal realm and will warm to his 
work with a zeal for clarity and precision in her work that will withstand scientific 
scrutiny and will pass scientific muster. This is so because the subject matter of natural 
science is amenable to study, is intelligible to the thinker and is susceptible of a reasoned 
account. Further, what the thinker comprehends in thought can be articulated and clearly 
so.25  
      As the bottom brick in his bag, so to speak, near the conclusion of his treatise 
Wittgenstein opines in 6.53:  
                                                 
25  As pointed out in my Introduction, the motto of the Tractatus hyperbolically praises 
succinctness when it trumpets that whatever a man knows can be said in three words.  
Deftly Wittgenstein echoes and reinforces that sentiment in Section 5.4541 which 
provides, in pertinent part:  
Men have always had a presentiment that there must be a realm in which the 
answers to questions are symmetrically combined—a priori—to form a self-contained 
system. A realm subject to the law: Simplex sigillum veri.  
A free translation would be ‘Simplicity is the guarantor of truth.’ In section 
5.4541, Wittgenstein can be understood to mean the value of simplicity as an explanatory 
power is the persuasiveness of its lack of artifice and fraud. In science, as we know, there 
is the principle of parsimony under which the hypothesis proposed as a solution is best 
when it requires the fewest assumptions of the scientific community. 
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The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing 
except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science---i.e. something that 
has nothing to do with philosophy…. 
 
 In the section that follows I shall address how the motto supports Wittgenstein’s 
impulse to distinguish sense from nonsense through a regimentation of language and 
focus on the propositions of natural science. 
V. The Distinction between ‘Sense’ and ‘Nonsense.’  
Wittgenstein employs three technical vocabulary words in the Tractatus, namely, 
‘sense’ (Sinn), ‘senseless’ (Sinnlos) and ‘nonsense’ (Unsinnig). 
He first uses the term ‘sense’ in Section 2.221 as follows: “What a picture 
represents is its sense.” By way of commentary he immediately adds in Section 2.222: 
“The agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity.” 
Then, in contrast to ‘sense’ Wittgenstein yields up his technical use of ‘senseless’, 
which for him means lacking a sense or in the state of being without a sense. At Section 
5.132, he writes: “‘Laws of inference’, which are supposed to justify inferences, as in the 
works of Frege and Russell, have no sense, and would be superfluous.” An example of 
the foregoing would be a logical proposition, such as, a tautology about which there is 
more later in Section VI, below. 
Third, and finally, as to the technical term ‘nonsense’, as so concisely put by the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article, “Ludwig Wittgenstein”, “Nonsense, as 
opposed to senselessness, is encountered when a proposition is even more devoid of 
meaning, when it transcends the bounds of sense.” Especially instructive is Section 4.003 
which provides:  
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Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not 
false but nonsencical. Consequently, we cannot give any answers of this kind, but 
can only point out that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and 
questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our 
language. 
(They belong to the same class as the question whether the good is more or less 
identical than the beautiful.) 
And it is not surprising that our deepest problems are not problems at all. 
 
We know, with confidence, from his Preface, that Wittgenstein’s self-proclaimed 
aim of the Tractatus is to “draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the 
expression of thoughts:….”  Further, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article 
mentioned above goes on to conclude that Wittgenstein’s aim in the Tractatus was “to 
find the limits of world, thought and language; in other words, to distinguish between 
sense and nonsense.”  Such a view of the Tractatus, the traditional view, has it that 
Wittgenstein’s aim was to silence metaphysical conjecture by presenting his analysis of 
sense versus nonsense, including his theory that makes clear what can and cannot be said. 
This traditional view of the Tractatus jibes well with the conclusion contained within the 
Motto. 
Taken together, what seems clear from the above-cited passages is that 
Wittgenstein advocates a disciplined, rigorous approach to learning, one that realizes its 
limitations. If, as Wittgenstein teaches, we humans are limited to natural science in our 
ability to formulate meaningful thoughts, then, comparatively speaking, our universe of 
learning must be smaller than if there were no such limitation upon us. Stated differently, 
if, as Wittgenstein teaches, we are limited to the realm of natural science, then we in our 
human condition cannot really know very much. What we can know is most assuredly 
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not absolute but, rather, qualified. What we can know is only that which is within the 
realm of natural science and not otherwise. The Tractatus’ motto (“whatever a man 
knows…can be said in three words.”) exemplifies that idea.  
      Next, let us consider one example of something that Wittgenstein posited as 
falling outside the limits of what we can know. Characteristically, Wittgenstein shunned 
pronouncements concerning ethical imperatives telling us: “So too it is impossible for 
there to be propositions of ethics.” (6.42). Given that language marks the limits of our 
world and what can be known, we have evidence to think that ethics falls outside of what 
can be known.  
      I corresponded with Professor Victor Rodych who has the honor of being the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy author of the 2007 article, “Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophy of Mathematics.” On the connection of the Tractatus’ motto to ethics, 
Professor Rodych writes: 
Still the foregoing combination of the Preface and the motto does obviously apply 
to ethical pseudo-propositions. We cannot know such a ‘proposition’ to be true 
because they are not genuine propositions; one does not make an assertion with a 
declarative sentence of that form. (Correspondence, August 28- September 2, 
2008) 
 
Rodych emphasizes that just as the motto brings our attention to certain propositions as 
legitimate (those of natural science), it also rules out certain propositions (the ethical and 
the mystical) as illegitimate. 
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 In the section that follows I shall address how the motto reflects Wittgenstein’s 
say/show distinction and the way it leaves room for Wittgenstein’s view of ethics as 
ineffable but still important. 
VI. Wittgenstein’s Say/Show Distinction.  
A tantalizing paradox in the Tractatus is that the same author who claims that 
what can be known can be said succinctly is the very author who manages to say 
appreciably much spread across the eighty plus printed pages of his treatise. Bertrand 
Russell did not let this fact go unremarked in his Introduction to the Tractatus where, in 
two places on pages xxiii-xxiv, he gently chides Wittgenstein on this point. Russell 
writes: “What causes hesitation is the fact that, after all, Mr Wittgenstein manages to say 
a good deal about what cannot be said….” and, second, “The whole subject of ethics, for 
example, is placed by Mr Wittgenstein in the mystical, inexpressible region. 
Nevertheless, he is capable of conveying his ethical opinions.”  I do concur with 
Russell’s points and I maintain that we, Wittgenstein included, are all able to express a 
great deal. Let us consider, next, the force and justice of Wittgenstein’s position on this 
point, however, in light of his famous ‘say/show distinction.’ 
       In his ‘Biographical Sketch’ of Wittgenstein mentioned above, Professor von 
Wright makes it clear that a main ingredient of the Tractatus is the introduction of 
Wittgenstein’s doctrine of that which cannot be said, but can only be shown. 
Wittgenstein’s teaching is that we use propositions in the form of sentences in language 
to express ourselves but language has built-in limitations that mask and disguise the 
underlying logical form. As treated above, Wittgenstein held that we may say meaningful 
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things in natural science but when we venture beyond natural science our 
pronouncements become pseudo-propositions of no value and inherently meaningless. 
Nevertheless, even though certain things may not be said, it is still possible for things to 
be shown. 
      Consider an especially simple kind of logical truth, the tautology. A proposition in 
the form of ‘p v –p’ is an instance of the principle known as the law of the excluded 
middle. Every instance of this principle is a tautology. At Section 4.461 of the Tractatus 
Wittgenstein wrote:  
Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they 
say nothing. 
A tautology has no truth-conditions, since it is unconditionally true: and a 
contradiction is true on no condition. 
Tautologies and contradictions lack sense.26 
 
      In Section 4.0031 we learn, apparently via Bertrand Russell, that human language 
disguises the underlying logical form of a proposition. In Section 4.022 we learn that a 
proposition shows how things stand if it is true. Accordingly, what a proposition shows is 
a possible state of affairs. In order for a statement to say something it is required that such 
statement be either true or false in accordance with the reality of the world. 
      Not so, however, for a proposition of logic, such as, ‘If p, then q.’ A proposition 
of logic is a device that may be used over and over and has no truth value. It can show, 
but not say. 
                                                 
26 There is a string of relevant citations to the Tractatus that bears on the limitation on how humans can 
verbalize what we know and on the show/say distinction. op. cit., Pears and McGuinness, See: 4.0031; 
4.022; 4.0312; 4.115; 4.12; 4.121; 4.1211, 4.1212, together with 6.1, 6.11 and 6.12. 
Knoten, Thomas Patrick, 2009, UMSL, p. 19 
 
 
      Additionally, in section 4.0312 we learn that logical constants do not represent. In 
Section 4.115 we learn that philosophy will signify what cannot be said, by presenting 
clearly what can be said. Hence, in due course, in Sections 4.12 through 4.1212 we learn, 
inter alia, that propositions show the logical form of reality, that they do so by displaying 
it, and that what can be shown, cannot be said. 
      Finally, with respect to the foregoing string of citations, 6.1 provides: “The 
propositions of logic are tautologies.” and is followed by “Therefore the propositions of 
logic say nothing. (They are analytic propositions.)” (6.11) Wittgenstein, then, 
emphasizes in 6.12: “The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the 
formal—logical—properties of language and the world.” 
      Accordingly, notwithstanding the limit to what human knowledge can attain and, 
further, notwithstanding its implication that what we can say is very limited, it remains 
true that the form of our expressions manages to communicate a great deal. One 
commentator on the foregoing sections calls their teaching the ‘showing doctrine’, which 
is said to be manifested via the notion of ‘logical space’ and presents a sharp dichotomy 
between what we can express and what we can only manifest.27 Significantly, the 
commentator concludes: 
The tension between showing and saying is salient already in the motto of the 
Tractatus where Wittgenstein quotes Kurnberger’s dictum “…and whatever a 
man knows, whatever is not mere rumbling and roaring that he has heard, can be 
said in three words.” Here the tension is between the multiple content of 
knowledge and the severely limited amount of meaningful words that can express 
                                                 
27 Shlomy Maulem, “Language as a Twofaced Phenomenon: Wittgenstein’s Doctrine of  Showing in the 
Light of Heraclitus’ Concept of Logos” , Topicos Revisita de Filosofia (Mexico) (2001), 
http://firstsearch.oclc.org/WebZ/FSPage?pagename=record:pagetype=print;entityprinting=(September 
2008) 
Knoten, Thomas Patrick, 2009, UMSL, p. 20 
 
 
it, so that these three words must manifest much more than they can express; it 
comes out that singularity encloses generality. Such a tension between the 
particular and generality underlies Wittgenstein’s ‘showing doctrine’, as will be 
demonstrated hereby via the concept of ‘logical space’, which is one of the key 
notions of the Tractatus.28 
 
In this passage we see the idea that the motto embodies the say/show distinction in its 
declaration that everything a man knows can be expressed in “three words.” Rather than 
consider this from the perspective of the poverty of what can known, we can now 
consider the motto from the perspective of the power of our language to show a great deal 
of what cannot explicitly be said. 
     Furthermore, this above suggestion brings us to a different perspective on ethics. 
In fact Wittgenstein does not abjure the word ‘ethics’ and that word is expressly used 
near the end of the Tractatus. As noted earlier, in 6.42 he expands upon a point already 
made above by adding: “So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. 
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.” However, immediately following is 
6.421 which provides: “It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is 
transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.).” It seems that ethics falls 
under the category of what cannot be said but can be shown.  
      A concrete explanation of Wittgenstein’s fascination with the so-called 
ineffability of ethics is contained in an exchange of letters between Engelmann and 
Wittgenstein. On April 4, 1917, Engelmann wrote enclosing the poem “Count Eberhard’s 
Hawthorn” by the poet Uhland. It is a short, 28-line poem, which happens to be exactly 
twice the length of the standard British sonnet. Uhland, in that short plot of ground, 
                                                 
28 ibid. 
Knoten, Thomas Patrick, 2009, UMSL, p. 21 
 
 
manages to recount the story of a soldier who brought home from war with him a sprig 
cut from a Hawthorn bush which he, then, planted at home. Much later, in his old age, the 
veteran sits beneath the shade of the flourishing adult Hawthorn tree, which serves as 
poignant reminder of his youth. Five days after having received that letter Wittgenstein, 
on April 9, 1917, wrote a thank-you letter to Engelmann in which he praised the poem as 
“really magnificent.” Wittgenstein enthused: “And this is how it is: if only you do not try 
to utter what is unutterable then nothing gets lost. But the unutterable will be –
unutterably—contained in what has been uttered.”    
      This collateral document helps to ‘cash out’ Wittgenstein’s position on 
ineffability. Certainly, his letter, on its face, communicates that a poet is able, by 
indirection, to create an emotional reaction in her reader. Uhland’s poetry succeeded in 
creating a mood, touching a chord within Wittgenstein.29   
 In the section that follows I shall show how the motto and the Preface of the 
Tractatus and the concluding line of the Tractatus point to a life characterized by 
activity. 
VII. The Tractatus Beckons not to the Poverty of Silence but to the Richness of Activity.   
                                                 
29 ‘The lunatic, the lover, and the poet 
Are of imagination all compact: 
One sees more devils than vast hell can hold, 
That is , the madman: the lover , all as frantic, 
Sees Helen’s beauty in a brow of Egypt: 
The poet’s eye, in a fine frenzy rolling, 
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to 
 heaven; 
And as imagination bodies forth 
The forms of things unknown, the poet’s pen  
Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing 
A local habitation and a name.”  
William Shakespeare, A Midsummer’s Night Dream, Act V, Scene I 
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It is crystal clear that Wittgenstein composed his treatise, the Tractatus, with a 
hierarchical structure with main propositions numbered 1 through 7.  What this means for 
Proposition 7 is that, although it is terse and often read as blended into the aphorisms of 
Section 6, it is, in actuality, the opening of a brand new, and main,  section of the 
Tractatus.  
 Just what is the meaning of Proposition 7? Is it in the sphere of logic…or more in 
the sphere of ethics, in keeping with its next preceding neighbors in Section 6?  
 In his biography of Wittgenstein, Ray Monk writes: “The famous last sentence of 
the book-‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’- expresses both a 
logico-philosophical truth and an ethical precept.” 30 
 Similarly, in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus –A Dialectical Interpretation, Matthew B. 
Ostrow opines:  
And that is to say that to “go on” with the task of the Tractatus is ultimately just 
to acknowledge the “must” in the text’s final remark – “Whereof one cannot 
speak, thereof one must remain silent” (TLP 7)-as the mark not of logical 
necessity but of ethical obligation.”31 
 
 Significantly, the Tractatus contains a lengthy and instructive section on the 
nature and function of correct philosophy. Section 4.112 reads: 
Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. 
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. 
 A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. 
Philosophy does not result in ‘philosophical propositions’, but rather in the 
clarification of propositions. 
Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to 
make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries. 
                                                 
30 Raymond Monk, Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius,  London, Vintage, 1990, page 156 
31 Matthew B. Ostrow, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus – A Dialectical Interpretation, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University press, 2002, page 133 
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 One of the important insights of the Tractatus, according to the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy article cited above, is the idea that philosophy is not a 
doctrine, and hence should not be approached dogmatically. In fact, for Wittgenstein, 
who worked as a full-time schoolmaster in Austria after World War I, philosophy was the 
enterprise of living life each day. 
 Cora Diamond, in her article, “Ethics, Imagination and the Method of 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”, posits a useful technique for interpreting the Tractatus. She 
accepts Wittgenstein’s pronouncement that his treatise is not a textbook and, further, that 
there is a kind of reading that it requires. She goes on to visualize a ‘frame’ of the work 
consisting of the Tractatus’ Preface and its closing sentences. In his Preface, of course, 
Wittgenstein flatly states: “The whole sense of the book may be summed up in the 
following words: what can said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about 
we must pass over in silence.” He, then, in the next sentence writes out the aim of his 
book respecting the drawing of limits to the expression of thoughts. 
 To complete the description of Diamond’s frame, however, requires us to take 
note of the closing sentences of the Tractatus. Here is where a misconstrual can and does 
occur. The antepenultimate sentence of the Tractatus begins Section 6.54 with its 
startling revelation by the author that his propositions are ‘nonsensical’ and, further, in 
the penultimate sentence, that the reader must transcend them in order to see the world 
aright. For some readers the spell cast by those two revelations lingers on to impact the 
meaning of the next main section of the Tractatus, which consists entirely of one 
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proposition, namely, the final sentence of the Tractatus: “7  What we cannot speak about 
we must pass over in silence.” 
  I am impressed by Ostrow’s insight:  
Given the emphasis of so much recent literature on 6.54, one might well suppose 
that this remark was in fact the text’s final statement that Wittgenstein leaves us 
with his pronouncement of the nonsensicality of everything philosophical. In fact, 
though, the Tractatus ends with propositions 7’s call for silence….Wittgenstein’s 
claims, it would seem, find their real fulfillment not in what we say, but in what 
we do.32 
 
 Accordingly, interpreting the last line of the Tractatus as not leading to the 
poverty of silence but to the richness of activity, arguably, is foreshadowed in the 
Tractatus’ Preface which itself is anticipated by the motto. 
 In the next section of my thesis I shall show how Wittgenstein, with homage to 
Schopenhauer, teaches how one has access to an ethical insight. 
VIII. Wittgenstein Teaches that an Ethical Insight is not Something that is Cognitively 
Reasoned but Something Compassionately Felt.   
Under Section VI above, I conclude that one of the Tractatus’ teachings is that 
language marks the limits of what can be known and that ethics falls outside of what can 
be known.  A tension is created later in Section VI when I conclude that even though 
certain things, such as ethics, may not be said, it is, nevertheless, possible for them to be 
shown. Can ethics, according to the Tractatus, be known or not? How does one resolve 
that tension? 
 As indicated in Section III above, Schopenhauer is in the Kantian tradition and, 
according to both Kant and Schopenhauer, total reality is divisible into what is 
                                                 
32 ibid., page 13-14 
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susceptible of being known and what is not. By construing the Tractatus, a document 
written by an Austrian in his  native German language, in light of Schopenhauer’s 
substantial oeuvre, one arrives at a world view that reality is divisible into what can be 
known and what cannot, into what is rational and what is not, and into what is cognitive 
and what is non-cognitive. 
 The pessimism of Schopenhauer when he looked out on a state of nature that was 
“red in tooth and claw”, on a world of blind impulse devoid of rationality and on a cold, 
indifferent universe was not lost on the young and brooding Ludwig. He used 
Schopenhauerian idealism as his point of departure and contributed to posterity such 
novel and philosophically-freighted aphorisms as “How things are in the world is a matter 
of complete indifference for what is higher.” (Section 6.432); “It is not how things are in 
the world that is mystical, but that it exists. (Section 6.44); and “There are indeed things 
that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is 
mystical.” (Section 6.522) 
 Significantly, according to Glock, Wittgenstein characterizes mysticism by 
reference to two features: 
1. It not only lies beyond all possible knowledge, but is also incommunicable or 
ineffable, something ‘which cannot be put into words’ but ‘shows itself’…. 
 
2. It is a feeling of union with God or the universe, a ‘consciousness of the 
identity of one’s own inner being with that of all things, or with the kernel of the 
world.’33 
 
 My contention is that the perceived tension between having no epistemic access to 
ethics and how ethics is made manifest is not a real tension but an apparent one. 
                                                 
33 op. cit., Janaway, The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer,  page 441 
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Wittgenstein, like Schopenhauer before him, executes a turn from the cognitive to the 
non-cognitive. Wittgenstein never purports to be able to know ethical commandments or 
to have meaningful discourse about such. Instead, his ethics is the result of his 
confrontation with the indifference of the universe.34  
Wittgenstein saw combat in World War I. His biographer Monk records that 
while Wittgenstein was at the battlefront, from March to May, 1916, he was able to write 
little on logic in his diary-type notebooks. Significantly, an entry in his notebook from 
that time period found its way unchanged into the Tractatus which we now read as 
Sections 6.371 and 6.372: 
The whole conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called 
laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena. 
Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something 
inviolable, just as God and Fate were treated in past ages. 
 
 In the ensuing months the combat intensified in Wittgenstein’s sector under the 
assault of the Brasilov Offensive in June, 1916. It was precisely at this time that the 
nature of Wittgenstein’s work changed, Monk tells us.35 On June 11, 1916, Wittgenstein 
recorded in his notebook the question: “What do I know about God and the purpose of 
life?”  Monk concluded that it was as if, for Wittgenstein, “…the personal and the 
philosophical became fused; ethics and logic—two aspects of the ‘duty to oneself’—had 
                                                 
34 Joseph Conrad is one writer who was strongly influenced by Schopenhauer. A friend of Conrad’s was the 
American writer Stephen Crane who, in his short story The Open Boat writes about sailors undergoing 
shipwreck: “When it occurs to a man that nature does not regard him as important, and she feels that she 
would not maim the universe by disposing of him, he at first wishes to throw bricks at the temple, and he 
hates deeply the fact that there are no bricks and no temple.” and, again, “It represented… the serenity of 
nature amid the struggles of the individual—nature in the wind, and nature in the vision of men. She did not 
seem cruel to him then, nor beneficent, nor treacherous, nor wise. But she was indifferent, flatly 
indifferent.”  Stephen Crane, The Open Boat, Gateway to the Great Books, Volume 3,  Chicago: 
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.,  1963,  pages 19-22 
35 op.cit., Monk,  page 139-140 
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finally come together, not merely as two aspects of the same personal task, but as two 
parts of the same philosophical work.”36  
 When Wittgenstein writes about God he does so in a metaphorical manner, that is, 
equating the meaning of life with “the meaning of the world, which we can call God.”37 
We are able to construe the Tractatus in light of his “A Lecture on Ethics” that 
Wittgenstein delivered to the Heretics Society, Cambridge University in November, 
1929.38 In it he rehearses for his live audience “the experience of feeling absolutely safe.”  
He equates this feeling with the state of mind in which one is inclined to say ‘I am safe, 
nothing can injure me whatever happens.’ He, then, explains that people use an 
allegorical explanation for this feeling by describing the experience of absolute safety by 
saying that “we feel safe in the hands of God.” Wittgenstein, in recognizing and 
accepting his fate as an insignificant part of the greater universe, is comfortable with a 
turn from the cognitive to non-cognitive feeling for his explanation of such an ethical 
insight. 
Hence, there is no fatal flaw in the Tractatus with respect to its mentioning of 
ethics. Yes, Bertrand Russell had gently chided Wittgenstein for appearing to try to have 
it both ways, not being able to talk about ethics and yet managing to say quite a lot on the 
topic. But understood as a non-cognitive experience of the indifference of the vast, cold 
universe toward any and all human beings there is no self-contradiction present. For 
                                                 
36 ibid., page 141 
37 ibid., page 141 
38 Ludwig Wittgenstein, “A Lecture on Ethics”, 1965, The Philosophical Review, 74:3-12 
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Wittgenstein, in the final analysis, ethics is something that he felt, not something about 
which he reasoned. 
IX. The Motto Beckons not to Philosophical Imponderables but to a Principled Life. 
The motto is similar to the treatise which it precedes: both have subtexts, both are 
intentionally obscure while otherwise leaving access open to ethical insights. With 
respect to the subtext of the motto it is, indeed, helpful in resolving whether or not ethics, 
according to the Tractatus, can be known. Wittgenstein almost certainly invested a great 
deal of thought and selectivity into his choice of a motto for the Tractatus. Wittgenstein 
chose a non-philosopher, Kürnberger, who lived a principled life and was willing to 
undergo imprisonment for acting on his convictions concerning the Dresden Rebellion of 
1849. Wittgenstein, thereby, paid homage to a personage who exemplified the teaching of 
the Tractatus which beckons one to progress from the poverty of silence to the wealth of 
activity. The affirmative statement of the motto is pregnant with a negative implication. 
The negative implication present is that where words fail, activity begins. Not to the 
poverty of silence does the motto beckon but, rather to the richness of a life of principled 
action. Hence, by affixing Kürnberger’s name to the title page the motto evokes 
associations with Kürnberger’s life. By honoring him thus, Wittgenstein demonstrates the 
connection between the motto’s negative implication and the Tractatus’ admonition to 
abandon philosophical imponderables for a commitment to a life lived in the present, 
therefore, timelessly, and lived in accordance with an ethics of compassion, therefore, 
lived well.  
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X. Conclusion 
 
We have undertaken an analysis of the motto of the Tractatus and have 
demonstrated the connection of the import of the motto with the cited passages of the 
Tractatus.39 The motto’s subject (“whatever a man knows…”) implies epistemic access 
to knowledge. The motto’s predicate (“…can be said in three words.”), however, alerts us 
to a limitation upon meaningful discourse. The motto is facially ambiguous for the reason 
that it is susceptible of two readings. First, it could mean that we humans do not know 
much at all. Or, second, it could mean that there is a limitation on how we can express 
ourselves. Under the first reading we have seen how the motto adumbrates the 
phenomena/noumena distinction and the sense/nonsense distinction that imbue the 
Tractatus. Under the second reading we have also seen the way in which the motto 
reflects Wittgenstein’s say/show distinction and the way in which it leaves room for 
Wittgenstein’s view of ethics as ineffable but still important. Additionally, we have seen 
how the admonition in Section 7 of the Tractatus beckons not to the poverty of silence 
but to the richness of activity. Further, we have seen that Wittgenstein, with homage to 
Schopenhauer, teaches that an ethical insight is something that is not cognitively 
reasoned but something that is compassionately felt. Finally, we have seen that, by 
                                                 
39 I acknowledge, with gratitude, the leadership of the faculty committee members, Stephanie A. Ross, 
Ph.D., Eric Wiland, Ph.D., and Jon D. McGinnis, Ph.D. and the expert supervision of my thesis adviser, 
Waldemar Rohloff, Ph.D. I had presented a paper on an earlier version of this analysis under Dr. Rohloff’s 
mentoring to the Philosophical Collaborations Conference at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 
March 19-20, 2009 and wish to express my gratitude to the faculty and graduate students of the SIUC 
Philosophy Department. 
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negative implication, the motto beckons the reader not to philosophical imponderables 
but to a principled life, which when lived in the present, is its own reward. 
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